Implementation security is a critical problem in quantum key distribution (QKD). With the advent of measurement-device-independent QKD, all security loopholes of the measurement unit have been closed. Securing the source, however, remains an elusive issue. Despite the tremendous progress made by developing security proofs that accommodate most typical source imperfections, such proofs usually disregard the effect of pulse correlations. That is, they disregard the fact that the state of an emitted signal can depend on the signals selected previously. Here, we close this gap by introducing a simple yet general method to prove the security of QKD with arbitrary pulse correlations. Our method is compatible with those security proofs that accommodate all the other source imperfections, thus paving the way towards achieving implementation security in QKD with arbitrary flawed devices. Moreover, we introduce a new security proof, which we call the reference technique, that provides high performance in the presence of source imperfections.
modulators as well as other imperfections of the intensity modulators [15] . Furthermore, we assume an asymptotic scenario where Alice sends Bob an infinite number of pulses.
Additional assumptions might be required depending on the particular security proof technique that is combined with our method. For instance, if the GLT protocol [18] or the RT based on the original LT protocol [17] (see the Methods section) are used, one also needs to assume that certain information about the states prepared by Alice is known. To be precise, for a setting choice j ∈ {0 Z , 1 Z , 0 X } (i.e., m = 3 in this case) made for the k th pulse, Alice prepares systems C k B k E in the following pure state
and then she sends systems B k and E to Bob over a quantum channel. In this equation, we need to know a lower bound on the coefficient a j (here, we take a j as a non-negative number satisfying 0 ≤ a j ≤ 1, which is possible by appropriately choosing the phase of the states in Eq. (1)) and a full characterisation of the density operator of the qubit B k derived from the state |φ j C k B k . We note, however, that the latter assumption can be relaxed by using the work in [24, 25] . The subscript C k B k E stands for all the systems that Alice prepares depending on j, which include not only the k th qubit (system B k ) that she sends to Bob but also the system C k , which is needed for purifying the state of system B k , and E is Eve's system. System E includes the systems sent by Alice and the ancilla systems kept in Eve's lab. Most importantly, we remark that Eq. (1) shows the most general state that can be prepared in a QKD protocol, representing most of the imperfections that a source possibly entails. This is so because we include Alice's and Eve's ancilla systems, thus purifying the state. Also, Eq. (1) simply decomposes a state |ψ j C k B k E in a given Hilbert space into a direct sum of two states, one of them in a qubit space, which can always be done for an appropriate choice of a j with 0 ≤ a j ≤ 1.
Moreover, in Eq. (1), |φ E represents the part of Eve's states that is independent of Alice's setting choice j, while the information leakage to Eve is expressed by |φ
, the state of the side-channels, which corresponds to unwanted and unknown modes. Note that, |φ
can take any form in any-dimensional Hilbert space and its characterisation is not required for these security analyses. This generality is achieved because the GLT protocol and the RT based on the original LT protocol assume the worst case scenario, where φ ⊥ j |φ ⊥ j C k B k E = 0 for all j, j ∈ {0 Z , 1 Z , 0 X } with j = j . We emphasise that this latter assumption never underestimates Eve's ability to obtain information about j, since a set of less orthogonal states can always be constructed from a set of more orthogonal states with unit probability. Therefore, whatever Eve could do in this worst case scenario is always possible also with the actual states, and thus the security proof based on the worst case scenario completely covers that based on the actual states. Finally, we remark again that by using Eq. (1), the results introduced in [18] already take into account any side-channel information except for pulse correlations. The main contribution of our work is to show that one can also accommodate the effect of pulse correlations through the parameter a j in Eq. (1) . Hence, our work demonstrates that most source imperfections, i.e., SPFs and side-channels, can be taken into account in an m-state protocol through this parameter.
The assumptions on Bob's devices also depend on the security proof. For example, in the case of the GLT protocol, one assumes that Bob measures the incoming pulses in the Z or the X basis. More precisely, Bob's measurements are represented by the positive-operator valued measures (POVMs) {M 0 Z ,M 1 Z ,M f } and {M 0 X ,M 1 X ,M f }, respectively. Here,M αβ corresponds to Bob obtaining the bit value α ∈ {0, 1} when selecting the basis β ∈ {Z, X}, andM f is associated with an inconclusive outcome. That is, we assume that these measurements satisfy the basis independent efficiency condition, because we impose that the operatorM f is the same for both basis. Note that, this condition is usually employed in security proofs to remove detector side-channel attacks exploiting channel loss [33, 34] , however, it is not necessary in MDI-QKD, to which our framework also applies. Furthermore, we emphasise that our method to deal with pulse correlations could be used as well with security proofs where the basis independent efficiency condition is not guaranteed, such as in [35] .
B. Security analysis in the presence of pulse correlations
In this section, we present the security analysis of QKD with pulse correlations. For this, we consider a security proof with the following properties. It employs an entanglement-based virtual protocol where Alice prepares pulses in an entangled state, and she (Bob) measures the local (incoming) systems to distil a secret key. Also, it considers a particular detected pulse to estimate the principal quantities in the security proof, such as the phase error rate or the min-entropy. Security against coherent attacks can then be guaranteed with the help of Azuma's inequality [36] or by applying the techniques in [37, 38] . Moreover, we assume that the security proof can be generalised such that it applies to a particular pulse with a side-channel. That is, it can be used to prove the security of QKD in the presence of active and/or passive information leakage. Thanks to the reduction technique presented below, a particular pulse affected by correlations can be regarded as a pulse with a side-channel, and therefore the security of QKD with pulse correlations is guaranteed. As an example, we demonstrate below that running an m-state protocol in the presence of nearest neighbour pulse correlations can be regarded as an m-state protocol in which each of the pulses entails side-channels. We emphasise, however, that it is straightforward to generalise this reduction technique to arbitrarily long range correlations (see the Methods section for more details).
Nearest neighbour pulse correlations
Let {|ψ j B } j=1,2,··· ,m be the set of m quantum states used in the m-state protocol. We assume that Alice chooses |ψ j B with probability p j and sends the pulse prepared in the chosen state to Bob over a quantum channel. As for Bob's measurements, as already mentioned above, the assumptions vary according to the selected security proof. In an entanglement-based picture with nearest neighbour pulse correlations, the transmission of n pulses by Alice can be described by first preparing n ancilla systems A and n pulses in the state
and then by sending system B to Bob. In Eq. (2), A = A 1 , A 2 , ..., A n (B = B 1 , B 2 , ..., B n ) refers to the composite system of Alice's ancilla systems (Bob's pulses), where A k (B k ) for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} denotes Alice's k th ancilla system (Bob's k th pulse), the index j k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m}, and {|j k A k } j k ∈{1,2,··· ,m} is a set of unnormalised orthogonal states with || |j k A k || = √ p j . Importantly, |ψ j k |j k−1 B k represents any nearest neighbour classical pulse correlation, namely, this is the state of the k th emitted pulse when Alice selects the setting j k , given that her previous setting choice was j k−1 . Now, suppose that after Alice sends Bob system B, Bob obtains click events for some of the received signals. Then, Alice and Bob perform fictitious measurements on their systems to generate the raw data in the experiment. We are interested in the state of their k th systems just before the fictitious measurements, which resulted in a click at Bob's detectors. To obtain this state, recall that any operations and measurements on system B, including the detection measurements on the pulses received by Bob, commute with Alice's measurements. Hence, we can assume that Alice has already measured her first k − 1 ancillas. Then, we have the resulting state as
. . .
where j 1 , · · · , j k−1 represent the outcomes of Alice's measurement on her first k − 1 ancillas. To simplify this state, we introduce the following definition
which forms a set of orthogonal bases as {|j k+1 A k+1 ,··· ,An,B k+2 ,··· ,Bn } j k+1 =1,··· ,m . Also, we define the state
By using the above two states, we can rewrite Eq. (3) as
As a reference, recall that if there were no pulse correlations in the m-state protocol, the resulting state, instead of being in the form given by Eq. (6), would become
where the state |λ A k+1 ,··· ,An,B k+1 ,··· ,Bn is independent of Alice's setting choice j k , and can be expressed as
In the security proof for the m-state protocol without pulse correlations, one typically obtains the phase error rate (or the min-entropy) by considering any attack on system B k in j k |j k A k |ψ j k B k in Eq. (7) . On the other hand, when there are nearest neighbour pulse correlations, one can see from Eq. (6) that Alice's information j k is encoded not only on system B k but also on the systems B k+1 , · · · , B n , and the state |λ j k A k+1 ,··· ,An,B k+1 ,··· ,Bn, serves as side-channel information about the state |ψ j k |j k−1 B k . This suggests that, if we obtain the phase error rate (or the min-entropy) by considering any attack on the composite systems B k and B k+1 , · · · , B n in
,··· ,An,B k+1 ,··· ,Bn , then the security follows. In other words, the m-state protocol with pulse correlations can be simply regarded as an m-state protocol where Alice prepares the states {|ψ j k |j k−1 B k |λ j k A k+1 ,··· ,An,B k+1 ,··· ,Bn } j k ∈{1,2,··· ,m} for any k and sends systems B k , B k+1 , · · · , B n to Bob. In general, the states {|ψ j k |j k−1 B k |λ j k A k+1 ,··· ,An,B k+1 ,··· ,Bn } j k ∈{1,2,··· ,m} are more orthogonal than the states without pulse correlations, {|ψ j k B k } j k ∈{1,2,··· ,m} , and they depend on the previous information j k−1 . The latter might suggest that Alice needs to keep a record of the information j k−1 in the actual protocol. However, one can remove this requirement by fictitiously imagining that Eve knows the setting choices of the previous j k−1 pulses and by considering a set of states {|ξ j k A k+1 ,··· ,An,B k ,B k+1 ,··· ,Bn } j k ∈{1,2,··· ,m} that is more orthogonal than any of the possible sets labelled by j k−1 . That is, by considering a set of states {|ξ j k A k+1 ,··· ,An,B k ,B k+1 ,··· ,Bn } j k ∈{1,2,··· ,m} such that the inner product of any pair of states within the set is equal or smaller than that of the equivalent pair of states in the original set {|ψ
As explained before, this consideration never underestimates Eve's ability since she can always make those states less orthogonal. This means that in order to prove the security of QKD with pulse correlations it suffices to prove the security of QKD with independently distributed states {|ξ j k A k+1 ,··· ,An,B k ,B k+1 ,··· ,Bn } j k ∈{1,2,··· ,m} that are more orthogonal than the original correlated states. This is a key point in our method and is illustrated in Fig. 1 . For a concrete example of the state {|ξ j k A k+1 ,··· ,An,B k ,B k+1 ,··· ,Bn } j k ∈{1,2,··· ,m} , refer to Eq. (13) in the next section.
Note that, our framework is also valid for the case where Alice emits mixed states instead of pure states. The emission of mixed states might happen due to imperfections in Alice's devices or when the prepared pure states are entangled with Eve's systems due to say a THA. To treat this latter scenario, the mixed states can be purified by introducing an ancilla system C k , with k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, which contains Alice's and Eve's systems. As a result, Eq. (6) becomes
Again, if a security proof for the m-state protocol without pulse correlations shows that one can estimate the phase error rate (or the min-entropy) for
,··· ,CnBn is also secure if one can obtain the parameters needed for the security proof given these latter states. More precisely, in the case of mixed states, to prove the security of QKD in the presence of pulse correlations one needs to prove the security of an m-state protocol that emits the states
Finally, we remark that, only for the purpose of estimating the phase error rate (or the min-entropy), in some cases it may make the mathematical analysis simpler to fictitiously consider an arbitrary attack on the systems A k+1 , · · · , A n (which, in reality, are inaccessible by Eve) besides the composite systems B k and B k+1 , · · · , B n . Note
No pulse correlations
Pulse correlations Figure 1 : Diagram illustrating the key point of our method to deal with pulse correlations. When there are no pulse correlations, Alice prepares and sends Bob the states {|ψ j k B k } j k ∈{1,2,··· ,m} for any pulse k, where j k is Alice's setting choice and m is the number of encoding choices. In the presence of pulse correlations, however, the prepared states can be regarded as the states {|ξ j k A k+1 ,··· ,An,B k ,B k+1 ,··· ,Bn } j k ∈{1,2,··· ,m} , where the information about j k is also encoded in subsequent pulses. By proving the security of a protocol employing the latter states, which are independently distributed (i.e., they are not correlated with other pulses), one proves the security of QKD in the presence of pulse correlations.
that, the number of systems that we include as side-channels does not matter, but what matters is how much the state |λ j k A k+1 ,··· ,An,B k+1 ,··· ,Bn depends on Alice's information j k . Therefore, such fictitious attack on A k+1 , · · · , A n should not result in general in a lower key rate because these ancillas do not directly entail information about j k .
C. Particular device model
Having stated the framework for the security proof in the presence of pulse correlations, we now consider a particular device model with only nearest neighbour pulse correlations. Moreover, we consider the LT protocol (i.e., the threestate protocol) [17] , and apply both the GLT analysis [18] , and the RT based on the original LT protocol (described in the next section), as the security proofs. They both require a state in the general form of Eq. (1). The purpose of this section is to show how to obtain the parameters needed in this equation for a particular device model. We remark that, for simplicity, below we do not consider THAs or mode dependencies. However, they could readily be included by using the method in [18] . Also, we assume that a single-photon source is available, and as a concrete example for modelling pulse correlations, we select the following nearest neighbour pulse correlation
for the three states. Here, |ψ j k B k is a qubit state with j k ∈ {0 Z , 1 Z , 0 X }, the parameter intuitively quantifies the strength of the correlation, θ j k |j k−1 represents how the k th state depends on the previous information j k−1 , and
is a state in the qubit space that is orthogonal to |ψ j k B k . Eq. (10) means that the stronger the correlation between pulses (i.e., the greater the value of the parameter ) is, the more information is leaked to the eavesdropper through the state |ψ
. The physical intuition of this model derives from the functioning of a phase modulator. To be precise, the state of an emitted pulse is typically affected by the modulation of the previous pulses such that there is a deviation in its pre-selected phase, which is quantified in the example given in Eq. (10) by θ j k |j k−1 .
Below, we show how to derive the state in the form of Eq. (1) starting from Eq. (10) . For this, we follow the idea introduced in the previous section and obtain the states |ψ
,··· ,Bn in Eq. (6). By using Eq. (10), we have that
where
is a normalised state independent of the information j k and, therefore, |ψ j k B k |φ A k+1 ,··· ,An,B k+1 ,··· ,Bn is a qubit state (note that, the set {|ψ
, and |ψ
is a state orthogonal to this qubit state. The explicit form of |ψ
is omitted here for simplicity but it could be straightforwardly obtained from Eq. (11) . Importantly, we can regard our protocol as a protocol that uses the states in Eq. (11) rather than the original states |ψ j k B k for any k. Note that, as before, only the parameter and the state |ψ j k B k need to be characterised. Also, we emphasise once again that the parameter and the state |ψ
in Eq. (11) represent most of the source imperfections (i.e., SPFs, mode dependencies and THAs) [18] , not only pulse correlations. This comes from the generality of Eq. (1). Moreover, by assuming the worst case scenario where the set {|ψ
basis we never underestimate Eve's ability. Therefore, to simplify the analysis, we assume this orthogonality in terms of the side-channel information. Note that, our analysis is valid for any orthonormal basis (i.e., our analysis only uses the information about the inner product when we consider the states |ψ
), and therefore we can omit the dependence on the value of j k−1 from the states |ψ
, as explained in the previous section. Furthermore, since the state |φ A k+1 ,··· ,An,B k+1 ,··· ,Bn is independent of j k , for the calculations we can re-express the state in Eq. (11) as
with j k ∈ {0 Z , 1 Z , 0 X }. By regarding the state shown in Eq. (13) as the state |ξ j k A k+1,...,An ,B k ,B k+1 ,...,Bn for the k th pulse, which is the crucial idea illustrated in Fig. 1 , our formalism to deal with pulse correlations can be used directly with both the GLT protocol and the RT based on the original LT protocol, since the states in Eq. (13) are in the form of Eq. (1).
In this section, we restricted the discussion to the case of nearest neighbour pulse correlations, but our formalism also applies to arbitrarily long range correlations. For instance, these correlations could be characterised by
for any w and k with w < k, wherej w represents a different setting choice to j w . That is, the correlation could be characterised through the response according to the change of the w th index. In other words, we can quantify the correlation represented by k−w , where k − w is the range of the correlation, by looking at the distinguishability of the states. One can show that, from this model, it is straightforward to obtain the three states in the form given by Eq. (1) (see the Methods section for more details) and consequently apply the selected security proof.
D. Reference technique based on the original loss-tolerant protocol
In this section, we outline the intuition behind the key idea of the RT by applying it to the original LT protocol [17] . To simplify the discussion, we shall assume collective attacks, however, our analysis can be generalised to coherent attacks (see the Methods section for more details). Just as an example, we consider a protocol with a single-photon source in the presence of side-channel information, such as pulse correlations, in which Alice prepares the following three states for each pulse emission
where B denotes the system to be sent to Bob. We remark that this subscript B could be replaced with
, · · · , B n and then we would recover Eq. (13). However, in this section we prefer to use Eq. (15) rather than Eq. (13) because the RT is general and applies as well to a scenario with any type of sidechannels, not only a side-channel arising from pulse correlations. In Eq. (15),
} j∈{0 Z ,1 Z ,0 X } is an orthonormal basis for the side-channels, and the qubit state |ψ j B is defined by [18] |ψ 0 Z B = |0 Z B ,
where {|0 Z , |1 Z } is a qubit basis and δ(≥ 0) is the deviation of the phase modulation from the intended value due to SPFs [18] . That is, when there is no side-channel information, the states of the single-photons sent by Alice have the form given by Eq. (16), but in the presence of side-channel information, however, these states are defined by Eqs. (15) and (16) . As a result, {|ψ
} j∈{0 Z ,1 Z ,0 X } is no longer a qubit. To prove the security of this protocol we need to evaluate its phase error rate. The key idea of the RT is to consider the phase error rate estimation that we would obtain if we replace the actual set of states of the protocol, {|Ψ 0 Z B , |Ψ 1 Z B , |Ψ 0 X B }, with another set of states, which we call the reference states. The reference states need to be selected such that they are similar to the actual states and there is a simple relationship between the events associated with them. Being the intuition that since the actual and the reference states are close to each other, one should be able to obtain a relationship between the events associated with the actual states by slightly modifying the relationship for the reference states. Here, we select the reference states to be linearly dependent states such that unambiguous state discrimination (USD) [40, 41] is not possible. This allows us to use directly the original LT protocol [17] to estimate precisely some quantities associated with the reference states and their relationship, as an intermediate step towards obtaining the phase error rate associated with the actual states.
As an example, we select the reference states to be {|Ψ 0 Z B , |Ψ 1 Z B , |Φ 0 X B } with |Φ 0 X B described below, and we fictitiously consider that Alice chooses these states with the same probabilities as the actual states. That is, we borrow |Ψ 0 Z B and |Ψ 1 Z B directly from the actual states and define a qubit space spanned by {|Ψ 0 Z B , |Ψ 1 Z B }. The state |Φ 0 X B is obtained for example by projecting |Ψ 0 X B into the qubit space spanned by {|Ψ 0 Z B , |Ψ 1 Z B }. Then, by exploiting the fact that the reference states are all qubit states, one can follow the idea of the original LT protocol [17] . In doing so, we obtain
where Y (Z)es s X ,α X |Ref with s, α ∈ {0, 1} is the joint probability (i.e., the yield) that Alice prepares a state in the Z basis, both Alice and Bob measure their systems (defined in an entanglement-based virtual protocol for the security proof) in the X basis, Alice (Bob) obtains the bit value α (s), conditional on selecting the reference states. These are the probabilities required to estimate the phase error rate; since they are associated with quantities we need to estimate, we append "es" as a superscript. Similarly, Y (β)obs s X ,α β |Ref with α β ∈ {0 Z , 1 Z , 0 X } is the joint probability (i.e., the yield) that Alice prepares a state corresponding to selecting the setting α β , Bob chooses the X basis and obtains the bit value s, conditional on selecting the reference states. These probabilities are related with the quantities that would be directly observed in an experiment employing the reference states, thus we append "obs" as a superscript. Note that, in Eqs. (17) and (18) we redefine Alice's setting choice j as α β to be able to refer to the basis choice and the bit value separately. Moreover, P Z (P X ) is the probability of choosing the Z (X) basis, with the subscript A (B) that appears in Eqs. (17) and (18) referring to Alice (Bob),
) with t ∈ {Id, x, z} are the coefficients of the Bloch vector associated with the estimated (observed) quantity (see the Methods section for their explicit form) and q s X |t can be regarded as the transmission rates of the Pauli operatorσ t . See [17] for more details. Importantly, by solving the set of linear equations given by Eq. (18) for α β ∈ {0 Z , 1 Z , 0 X }, one can express the transmission rates q s X |t in terms of the observed quantities Y (β)obs
and T means transpose. By plugging the expressions of q sx|t given by Eq. (19) into Eq. (17), we obtain a relationship between the phase error probabilities Y (Z)es s X ,α X |Ref and the yields associated to the events that would be observed in an experiment employing the reference states Y (β)obs s X ,α β |Ref . Note, however, that we have no access to the yields of this fictitious experiment because in the actual experiment we use the actual states. Fortunately, by exploiting the closeness between the reference and the actual states, we can obtain bounds on the actual yields and consequently the phase error rate of the actual protocol.
To find these bounds, we consider how much the yields for the actual states can deviate from those for the reference states. To begin with, recall that the first two reference states, |Ψ 0 Z B and |Ψ 1 Z B , are equal to the actual states. Therefore, we have that
where Y (Z)obs s X ,0 Z |Act and Y (Z)obs s X ,1 Z |Act represent the actual yields. Similarly, by recalling that the phase errors are defined by using the states |Ψ 0 Z B and |Ψ 1 Z B , we have that
Importantly, we remark that the relationship between the parameters q s X |Id , q s X |x , q s X |z , and Y (Z)es s X ,α X |Act is the same as that between q s X |Id , q s X |x , q s X |z , and Y (Z)es s X ,α X |Ref thanks to Eq. (22) .
Next, we consider the difference between the yields of the states |Ψ 0 X B and |Φ 0 X B . In particular, we consider the maximum deviation between |Ψ 0 X B and |Φ 0 X B in terms of the probability of obtaining an outcome from some measurement. That is, we consider the maximisation, over any measurement, of |P (l| |Ψ 0 X B ) − P (l| |Φ 0 X B )|, where P (l| |Ψ 0 X B ) (P (l| |Φ 0 X B )) is the probability of obtaining the measurement outcome l given the state |Ψ 0 X B (|Φ 0 X B ). For this, we introduce an ancilla system in the state |0 E and consider the most general measurement that can be performed on |Ψ 0 X B |0 E and |Φ 0 X B |0 E , which is simply a projection measurement. The maximisation is then rather straightforward, and we find that |P (l|
2 . Importantly, no measurement, including any measurement performed by Eve, can induce a larger deviation. Note that, here one could also use the trace distance argument [15] , however, for the problem at hand, that bound is loose and, therefore, we employ a tighter bound. In fact, the bound suggested in this work could be used to improve the results in [15, 16] . The deviation between the states |Ψ 0 X B and |Φ 0 X B indicates that the inequality in terms of the yields is
where p 0 X is the probability of choosing the setting 0 X in the actual protocol. Depending on the assumptions on Bob's receiver, one might also include on the R.H.S. of Eq. (23) the probability, p X B , that Bob selects the X basis. The LT protocol assumes that Bob's measurements are independent from any event and identical, and thus p X B could be included. However, for consistency with the discussion in the Methods section, which considers a general scenario, here we prefer to conservatively use Eq. (23) which is an upper bound on the desired quantity independently on the assumptions about Bob. This highlights the generality of the RT described in the Methods section. Finally, we obtain the relationship for the actual states as
By solving this equation in terms of q s X |Id , q s X |x , and q s X |z , and by plugging their expressions into the yields, which we have derived in Eqs. (17) and (22), we can express the phase error rate for the actual states as
Note that −1 ≤ w 0 X ≤ 1 is chosen to maximise the phase error rate. Also, note that e X is a function of
where the denominator represents the transmission efficiency of the single-photons in the key generation basis. This means that, as expected, the deviation term d 0 X is enhanced with channel losses due to the possibility of Eve performing a USD measurement [40, 41] . To clarify, an USD measurement is not possible when the reference states are employed since they are linearly dependent, but it is possible when the actual states are employed. This is so because the actual states are linearly independent due to the presence of side-channel information. Moreover, we remark that the resulting upper bound on the phase error rate depends on the particular reference states chosen, and in the simulations presented in the next section, we choose |Φ 0 X B as the state that is obtained by projecting |Ψ 0 X B into the qubit space spanned by |Ψ 0 Z B and |Ψ 1 Z B .
E. Simulation of the secret key rate
To show the performance of QKD in the presence of pulse correlations we now present the simulation results. We apply our method to three different frameworks: the GLT protocol [18] , the RT described in the previous section and the LP analysis [19] , and we compare the results. We emphasise that pulse correlations are not taken into account in [18, 19] , however, we can apply our method to deal with pulse correlations to these security analyses. To be precise, we simply consider a QKD protocol with the states in Eqs. (15), (16) and (26), and apply the GLT protocol and the LP analysis. That is, besides pulse correlations we also include the effect of SPFs by assuming δ > 0 in Eq. (16) . In general, system B in Eqs. (15) and (16) can include more systems, not only those sent to Bob. Indeed, in these equations the subscript B could be replaced by the subscript S := A k+1 , · · · , A n , B k , B k+1 , · · · , B n , allowing us to consider pulse correlations as the side-channel. Note that, to simplify the mathematical analysis we do not trace out Alice's subsequent systems A k+1 , · · · , A n .
For the comparison between the three security analyses to be fair, the efficient four-state LT protocol is used in the simulations. In other words, we suppose that Alice chooses randomly between two LT protocols where the third state sent in each of them is |Ψ 0 X S and |Ψ 1 X S , respectively. This means that the hardware required to implement this scheme coincides with that of the BB84 protocol [27] , making both protocols equivalent from an experimental standpoint. Here, we assume that the phase modulation applied by Alice to her single-mode qubit states is proportional to the chosen phase value, as in [18] . We define |Ψ 1 X S as [18] 
Furthermore, to illustrate the versatility of our technique we also plot the secret key rate for pulse correlations of various ranges using the assumption given by Eq. (14) (see the Methods section), which results in a change in the amplitude of the parameter in Eq. (15) . In the asymptotic regime, the secret key rate formula for a single-photon source can be expressed as
where Y Z is the single-photon yield in the Z basis, h(x) = −x log 2 (x) − (1 − x) log 2 (1 − x) is the binary entropy function, and f is the error correction efficiency. The term e X is the phase error rate and the term e Z is the bit error rate. Note that, Y Z and e Z are directly observed in a practical implementation of the protocol, but in the simulations a channel model (see [18] for more details) is employed instead. The experimental parameters used are: dark count rate of Bob's detectors p d = 10 −7 , f = 1.16 and the probabilities for Alice and Bob to select the Z basis are, for simplicity, P Z A = P Z B = 1 2 . Unfortunately, there are no quantitative works characterising pulse correlations (i.e., the value of the parameter ) therefore, for illustration purposes, we select the values 10 −3 and 10 −6 to evaluate this imperfection. Also, in order to investigate how the length of the pulse correlations affects the secret key rate, we consider the nearest neighbour correlation 1 , as well as correlations among two subsequent pulses, 2 , and among ten subsequent pulses, 10 (see Eq. (14) for the definitions of these epsilon parameters). Regarding SPFs, we choose δ = 0 and δ = 0.063 according to the experimental results reported in [42] [43] [44] . The results are illustrated in Fig. 2 .
As expected, this figure shows that when the magnitude of pulse correlations characterised by i increases the secret key rate decreases. Also, as the length of the correlations taken into account increases the secret key rate drops. We note, however, that even when long range correlations are considered, a secret key can still be obtained. Namely, Fig. 2 shows that one can generate a secret key even when there are correlations between ten subsequent pulses in all the parameter regimes investigated, when using the RT and the LP analysis. Clearly, for a smaller value of the parameter i longer correlations can be included. In fact, if i is small enough, one can consider a very long range of pulse correlations while guaranteeing the security of QKD.
We emphasise that the security proof selected highly affects the results obtained, and this is also illustrated in Fig. 2 , where we apply our technique to three different security analyses. In particular, this figure demonstrates the good performance of the RT when applied to the original LT protocol. The reason is because the RT (see the Methods section) provides a tighter estimation of the phase error rate, when compared with the two other security analyses, and therefore a better performance. We remark that the RT approach is general and can be applied to other QKD protocols as well. In simple terms, it allows us to quantify how far the actual states are from the reference states, therefore constraining the amount of information that can be used by Eve to learn the secret key.
To compare the GLT protocol, the RT and the LP analysis as a function of pulse correlations one can examine Figs. 2(a) and 2(b), or Figs. 2(c) and 2(d). Noticeably, as the magnitude of the pulse correlation i increases, the secret key rate deteriorates for all of them. However, the RT outperforms the GLT protocol and the LP analysis in all the parameter regimes investigated. By comparing Figs. 2(a) and 2(c), or Figs. 2(b) and 2(d), one can see the effect of SPFs. As expected, the GLT protocol and the RT are barely affected by this imperfection since they are tolerant to SPFs. However, the secret key rate for the LP analysis evidently decreases as SPFs increase. This happens because in the LP analysis it is assumed that Eve can enhance her knowledge about the key by exploiting channel loss, but in the GLT protocol and the RT this is circumvented and the performance is maintained. Importantly, even when there are no SPFs the RT still performs better than the LP analysis. This suggests that the RT is the preferable security proof when the emitted pulses are correlated. Most importantly, as explained above, our work shows that most of the source imperfections can be taken into account through the parameter i , thus the RT performs better even when any combination of the four main imperfections (i.e., SPFs, mode dependencies, THAs and pulse correlations) is present. In summary, the results presented represent a big step forward towards achieving implementation security in QKD.
III. DISCUSSION
Security proofs of QKD have to consider source imperfections in the theoretical models. Fortunately, state preparation flaws (SPFs), Trojan horse attacks [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] and mode dependencies have been considered together very Figure 2 : Secret key rate R against the overall system loss measured in dB in the presence of correlations between the emitted pulses when our method is applied to the generalised loss-tolerant (GLT) protocol [18] , to the reference technique (RT) for the original loss-tolerant protocol [17] and to the Lo-Preskill's (LP) analysis [19] . In all graphs, the blue, red and black lines are associated with the GLT protocol, the RT and the LP analysis, respectively. The solid lines correspond to the nearest neighbour pulse correlations 1 , while the dashed (dashed-dotted) lines correspond to the second 2 (tenth 10 ) neighbour pulse correlations as indicated in the legend. (a) Even when there are no SPFs and the parameter is low, the RT outperforms the GLT protocol and the LP analysis. (b) As the parameter decreases, all security proofs provide a higher secret key rate but the RT is still superior. (c) In the presence of SPFs the secret key rate is slightly worse in all cases. (d) For high SPFs and low , the RT is considerably better than the GLT protocol and the LP analysis. Note that, in this figure the black lines cannot be distinguished with the resolution presented. recently in [18] . In this work, we have introduced a general framework to deal with pulse correlations, which are the last piece required for securing the source. Importantly, our framework is compatible with those security proofs that incorporate other source imperfections, and therefore it can be used to guarantee implementation security with arbitrary flawed devices, by combining it with measurement-device-independent QKD [5] and the results in [18] . The key idea is interpreting the information encoded in the subsequent pulses as a side-channel information. By doing so, we have shown that, as long as the magnitude of the correlations is small, a secret key can still be obtained even when there are correlations over a long range of pulses. Moreover, our framework can be directly applied in combination with existing security proofs such as the generalised loss-tolerant (GLT) protocol, the Lo-Preskill's (LP) analysis [19] and the numerical techniques recently introduced in [21] [22] [23] .
Furthermore, we have proposed a new security proof, which we call the reference technique (RT). It uses reference states that are similar to the states sent in the actual protocol, thus allowing us to determine the observables needed to prove the security of the latter. We have shown that by applying this technique to the original loss-tolerant (LT) protocol [17] one can obtain high secret key rates in the presence of pulse correlations. Since we have demonstrated that most of the source imperfections can be incorporated together into the framework presented, we conclude that the RT based on the original LT protocol maintains a high performance in the presence of source imperfections. We have not considered the decoy-state method [2] [3] [4] in this work, and, therefore, the imperfections of the intensity modulator have not been included. However, we remark that our framework could be combined with the decoy-state method to ensure the security of arbitrarily flawed sources. This problem is however beyond the scope of this paper.
To show the applicability of our method, we have compared the GLT protocol, the RT and the LP analysis, and we have investigated which security proof results in a higher secret key rate as a function of pulse correlations and SPFs. For the experimental parameters selected, we have confirmed that the RT outperforms the other security proofs in all cases. The dramatic difference observed in Fig. 2 between the GLT protocol and the RT in the presence of imperfect sources arises because of two main reasons. First, recall that in [18] the upper bounds on the virtual yields and on the actual yields are obtained by calculating certain eigenvalues and thus they entail square root terms, which deteriorate the secret key rate. Note that, in the trace distance argument [15] , square root terms are also present. However, with the RT these terms do not appear and a high performance is maintained. The other reason comes from the fact that most of the upper bounds on the virtual and the actual yields used in the GLT protocol are avoidable with the RT. In fact, when employing the RT we only obtain one upper bound on the actual yields associated with the setting choice 0 X . Remarkably, the RT combines the advantages of the GLT protocol and the LP analysis, and guarantees high secret key rates in the presence of flawed, leaky and correlated sources. Therefore, it seems to be the most suitable security analysis to prove the security of practical QKD.
IV. METHODS

A. Reference technique
In this section, we present the RT in detail. This technique can be applied to many QKD protocols. In simple terms, we consider a set of ideal states called the reference states, which serve as a reference to the actual states one actually uses. Given that the reference states and the actual states are sufficiently close to each other, then the probability for each event obtained with the reference states should be similar to that obtained with the actual states. Therefore, a relationship between the probabilities associated with events when employing the reference states can be used as a tool to estimate the required quantities to prove the security of the actual protocol. Below, we formalise our idea and outline its application.
Let us assume an actual m-state protocol where Alice chooses, with probability p j , a state from the set {|ψ j B } j=1,2,··· ,m , where the state |ψ j B is normalised, for each pulse emission. We also assume that the key is generated from a subset of states indexed by j = 1, · · · , m key , where m key is the number of states used for generating the secret key. In order to prove the security of this actual protocol, one exploits another set of normalised states {|φ j B } j=1,2,··· ,m , which we call the reference states, where each |φ j B is chosen to be close to the state |ψ j B . For instance, suppose that the set of actual states is
⊥ X B } with 0 < ≤ 1, where the parameter quantifies the deviation from the qubit space spanned by {|0 Z B , |1 Z B }, |0 X B is a qubit state living in this space and |0 ⊥ X B is a state living in any Hilbert space orthogonal to the qubit state. Then, we may select the set of reference states as {|0 Z B , |1 Z B , |0 X B }, where all the states are now qubit states. Importantly, the set of the reference states should be chosen such that a relationship between the probabilities of the events associated with the reference states can be easily obtained. Intuitively, since each state |φ j B is close to the state |ψ j B , the probabilities of any measurement outcome associated to these two states should be close to each other. Therefore, we are able to obtain the required observables for the security proof of the actual protocol by slightly modifying the relationship between the probabilities associated with the reference states. In what follows, we make this intuition rigorous.
Also, we remark that our security proof does not require the run of a protocol in which Alice employs the reference states, we just exploit them as a mathematical tool to establish a relationship in terms of the probabilities of the events in the actual protocol, that are needed for the security proof. The recipe to obtain a relationship for the observables required to prove the security of the actual protocol can be summarised as follows.
1. Assume that the actual protocol can be converted into an entanglement-based virtual protocol, in which Alice's choices j and the quantum states |ψ j B sent to Bob are the same as those in the actual protocol. In such virtual protocol, Alice sends all the systems B to Bob over a quantum channel, and afterwards they start to measure their systems in order. That is, we consider a delayed measurement by Alice and Bob.
2. Employ a security proof where an upper bound on a physical quantity needs to be estimated, such as the number of phase errors within the detected events.
3. In order to estimate the physical quantity defined in step 2, consider a particular round of Alice's and Bob's measurements (say the k th round) in the virtual protocol and assume the most general attack that might be performed by an eavesdropper. Now, we imagine replacing only the k th actual pulses with the reference states, and we select these reference states appropriately such that by exploiting the security proof employed in step 2 the following relationship holds
Here, q es (q obsγ,j , with Alice's setting choice j and Bob's measurement result and basis choice γ) stands for an estimated (observed) quantity, which is a joint event that includes a detection event, the term Ref refers to the selection of the reference states, and f is a concave function with respect to its variables obeying the following property
where N is a positive integer. Importantly, P (k) (q es |Ref ) is the fictitious probability that the physical quantity required in the security proof would occur at the k th round if the set of the actual states at the k th round only is replaced with the reference states. In other words, this fictitious probability is conditional on the reference states rather than on the actual states. Similarly, {P (k) (q obsγ,j |Ref )} γ=1,2,··· ;j=1,2,··· ,m is a set of fictitious probabilities associated to events (which would be directly accessible in an experimental implementation) that would occur at the k th round if the set of the actual states at the k th round only is replaced with the reference states.
4. Transform the relationship for the reference states in Eq. (28) to a relationship in terms of events associated to the actual states. This is done by just replacing the probabilities in Eq. (28) with the probabilities in the actual protocol. To be precise, we modify Eq. (28) as
where ω key and ω j are real numbers satisfying −1 ≤ ω key ≤ 1 and −1 ≤ ω j ≤ 1, which are chosen such that they maximise the R.H.S. of Eq. (30) . This maximisation results in the parameters w key,max and w j,max , which are used from this point onwards. Note that, if the maximisation at this stage is difficult, say due to a lack of knowledge about the probabilities, we can postpone it until Eq. (35). In Eq. (30),
where A is Alice's ancilla system employed in the entanglement-based virtual protocol and {|j A } j=1,2,··· ,m is an orthogonal basis with A j |i A = δ j,i p j (in which δ j,i is the Kronecker delta). Moreover, as already mentioned above, m key is the number of states in the set {|ψ j B } j=1,2,··· ,m that are involved in the key generation basis, i.e., in defining the phase error rate. For instance, in the standard security proof of the BB84 scheme [27] or in the LT protocol [17] , the phase errors are defined in the Z basis, hence m key = 2 in these cases. Note that, d key and d j depend on the inner product between the reference states and the actual states, therefore their value depends on the reference states selected.
5. Now, we concentrate on a round that results in a detected event, i.e., when Bob obtains a bit value. Let us redefine such a round as k, and divide the inequality in Eq. (30) by the probability of obtaining a detected event
where P (k) (q es|det ) is the probability that the quantity that has to be estimated occurs at the k th round conditional on a detection event. Note that, since only rounds with detected events are being considered, P (k) (q det ) = 0 holds. The probability P (k) (q obsγ,j |det ) is defined similarly. In Eq. (33), d
j|det ) is the maximum deviation between the probability of an estimated (observed) quantity when using the reference states and the actual states, conditional on a detection event. Also, we note that to derive Eq. (33) we used the property of the function f stated in Eq. (29).
6. Transform Eq. (33) to an inequality in terms of the number of occurrences (instead of probabilities) by exploiting the properties of the function f as well as some probability inequality. First, take a summation over k = 1, 2, · · · , N det , where N det denotes the number of detected events, and write
where the Jensen's inequality [45] for concave functions was used. Next, apply some probability inequality, such as, for example, the Azuma's inequality [36] , to
j|det . The goal is to relate the expected number of events to the actual number of events. As a result, the actual numbers of the corresponding events, which we denote by N (q es|det ), N (q obsj,γ |det ), N (d key|det ) and N (d j|det ) can be obtained. Such estimation is typically valid except for an exponentially small probability in N det . The last two actual numbers of events cannot be accessed directly from an experimental implementation of the protocol. Therefore, to estimate them one can assume the worst case scenario, in which all the events associated with d key and d j among all signals emitted by Alice (not only the signals detected) are accumulated into the detection events. Now, the final task is to estimate upper bounds on the numbers N (d key ) and N (d j ). For this, one can employ some probability inequality whose estimations succeed except for an exponential small probability in N , where N is the total number of trials (i.e., it is the number of pulses emitted in the protocol). 
where, for simplicity, the deviation terms due to the probability inequalities employed are omitted. Finally, to estimate the phase error rate one divides Eq. (35) by N det and obtains
This expression, which holds except for an exponentially small probability in N det and N , can be used to establish the security of the actual protocol.
The steps 3 and 4 are the most important parts in the recipe presented above, while all the other steps are quite standard and often employed in security proofs [47] . The key point in the RT is given by Eqs. (30)- (32) . For instance, Eq. (31) essentially states that the maximum deviation between the probability of an event associated to the actual states {|ψ j B } j=1,2,··· ,m and to the reference states {|φ j B } j=1,2,··· ,m can never be larger than d key , and the same statement holds for d j in Eq. (32) . In the main text we have shown how to apply this RT to a particular example. Below, we justify and explain the recipe presented, making special emphasis on steps 3 and 4.
To prove the security of the actual protocol, we consider a particular round of Alice's and Bob's measurements (say the k th round) in the entanglement-based virtual protocol and assume that Eve performs a coherent attack. As the entangled state that Alice prepares in the actual protocol we take |Act AB := m j=1 |j A |ψ j B , and we also consider the entangled state for the reference states as |Ref AB := m j=1 |j A |φ j B . Here, A is Alice's virtual system, and i| j = δ j,i p j , where p j is the probability that Alice chooses the setting j in the actual protocol. In particular, we consider the probabilities P (k) (q es |Act) and P (k) (q obsγ,j |Act), where Act is used to emphasise that these probabilities are defined for the actual states. Moreover, we have that these probabilities depend on Alice's, Eve's and Bob's measurement outcomes due to Eve's attack and the measurements performed by Alice and Bob on those systems different from the k th pulse. Now, the goal is to obtain the deviations between the probabilities associated with the actual states and with the reference states:
That is, we are interested in the maximum deviation between these probabilities if we only replace the k th actual state with the corresponding reference state.
Let us first consider Eq. (37) . In order to achieve the maximum deviation, we assume the worst case scenario, where all the systems AB different from the k th system are possessed and completely controlled by Eve, as well as her own systems. The state of all the systems in Eve's hands can be expressed by a pure state, which we denote by |0 E . This means that the deviation derived in this scenario can never be enhanced.
Recall that the event q es is associated with the secret key generation, and therefore it only occurs when the setting choice is the key generation states indexed by j = 1, · · · , m key . Hence, the probability P (k) (q es |Act) (P (k) (q es |Ref )) can be decomposed into a product of two probabilities, the first one is the probability of selecting the key generation basis, which is p key = m key j=1 p j , and the second one is the probability of obtaining such event q es conditional on the selection of the key generation basis. To consider the latter probability, we define the actual entangled state in the virtual protocol conditional on selecting the key generation basis to be m key j=1 |j A |ψ j B / √ p key =: |key|Act AB , and similarly the conditional state for the reference states is defined as
Since the most general measurement that can be performed on the composite system formed by the k th pulse and all the other systems presumed to be in Eve's hands (whose states are |key|Ref AB |0 E and |key|Act AB |0 E ), is simply a projection measurement, we have that
holds for any outcome l associated to any measurement performed by Alice, Eve, and Bob. Here, P (l| |key|Act AB |0 E ) (P (l| |key|Ref AB |0 E )) is the probability of obtaining the optimal measurement outcome l, which maximises the deviation, given the actual (reference) state |key|Act AB |0 E (|key|Ref AB |0 E ). Similarly, we have that
where we have used the fact that the event q obsj,γ involves Alice's setting choice j. Note that, in both Eqs. (39) and (40) we could have included the probability associated with Bob's basis choice. For instance, if Bob's measurements are independent, i.e., Bob's measurement operators over all the pulses received are expressed by a tensor product in terms of each of the pulses and his basis choice for each of the measurements is independent, then we could multiply Bob's probability on the R.H.S. of Eqs. (39) and (40) . However, the RT also applies when this condition is not assumed. In other words, the RT could be used with security proofs where the independence of Bob's measurements is not guaranteed, such as, for example, when there are correlations between Bob's measurements.
Since all the reference states are chosen such that they satisfy Eq. (28), we now have an inequality for the actual protocol of the form given by Eq. (33) by appropriately choosing the parameters ω key,max and ω j,max . The rest of the security proof runs according to the standard approach presented in the steps 5 and 6 above.
We emphasise that, the RT is also valid for mixed states. In general, mixed states can be purified by introducing Alice's and Eve's ancilla systems. That is, the system B in the actual states {|ψ j B } j=1,2,··· ,m and in the reference states {|φ j B } j=1,2,··· ,m would now include all the systems that Alice prepares, namely, her ancilla system, which is kept in her lab, together with the system to be sent to Bob, as well as Eve's system. After performing this purification, the recipe presented above applies directly.
Note that, as shown in Eq. (36), the phase error rate obtained is a function of d key /η and d j /η, where η := N det /N is the overall transmission efficiency of the system. In other words, the imperfections of the actual states {|ψ j B } j=1,2,··· ,m are unavoidably enhanced with channel loss, due to the existence of an USD measurement [40, 41] . In a practical implementation of QKD, source imperfections are always present, thus the actual states prepared by Alice are typically linearly independent. In this practical case (i.e., when the prepared states are linearly independent) the RT provides a high secret key rate as shown in Fig. 2 . However, if the source can prepare linearly dependent states then the RT does not help and it might be beneficial to employ another security analysis. For instance, if Alice prepares linearly dependent states and there are SPFs one can use the original LT protocol [17] , since this protocol does not suffer from the enhancement with channel loss, resulting in a better performance.
B. Arbitrarily long range pulse correlations
In this section, we show how to extend our analysis to accommodate arbitrarily long range correlations between the pulses. To simplify the discussion, we consider the three-state protocol, but this formalism can be easily extended to any number of states. Our starting point is the assumption in Eq. (14) . We rewrite it here for convenience,
where k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and 1 ≤ w ≤ k − 1. Note that the difference between both states is in the j th w index. Also, the R.H.S. of Eq. (41) does not depend on the indices j k , j k−1 , · · · , j 1 andj w , and the term k − w is associated with the correlation under consideration. For example, when k − w = 1 it refers to the nearest neighbour pulse correlation considered in the Results section. Furthermore, without loss of generality, we can assume the relation B k ψ j k |j k−1 ,··· ,jw+1,jw,jw−1,··· ,j1 |ψ j k |j k−1 ,··· ,jw+1,0 X ,jw−1,··· ,j1 B k ≥ 0,
after appropriately choosing the phase of the state |j w Aw . Using these assumptions, an extension of our framework is now presented. That is, we show how to obtain a lower bound on the parameter a j in Eq. (1) 
where j ζ ∈ {0 Z , 1 Z , 0 X } and ζ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Note that, j 0 represents having no condition, and the state |ψ j ζ |j ζ−1 ,··· ,j1 B ζ represents the long range pulse correlations, that is, the state of the ζ th pulse depends on all the previous setting choices. As before, we suppose that Alice measures her ancilla systems up to the k th pulse. More precisely, she measures the first k − 1 systems of {A ζ } ζ={1,2,··· ,n} by using the computational basis. The whole (unnormalised) state can then be expressed as 
To clarify, after Alice's measurement, the state |Ψ AB in Eq. (43) 
where |Φ j k−1 ,··· ,j 1 A k+1 ,··· ,An,B k+1 ,··· ,Bn , and |Φ . Recall that, the subscripts in the variables, e.g. a j k ,j k−1 ,··· ,j 1 , b j k ,j k−1 ,··· ,j 1 , or in the state |Ψ 
which is the state of the last (n−k) systems in Eq. (44) with only the k th index of |ψ j ζ |j ζ−1 ,··· ,j k+1 ,j k ,j k−1 ,··· ,j 1 B ζ being fixed to 0 X . Importantly, this state is independent of j k . Since a j k ,j k−1 ,··· ,j 1 is equal to the inner product between the state given by Eq. (46) 
which is the expression in the last parenthesis of Eq. (44), we can evaluate a lower bound for a j k ,j k−1 ,··· ,j 1 as 
In the second equality we use the result given by Eq. (42) and the inequality comes from Eq. (41).
C. Coefficients
In this section, we provide the explicit expressions for the coefficients of the Bloch vector. Direct calculation shows that these coefficients can be expressed as .
